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ABSTRACT 
 
Title VII protects against workplace discrimination in part through 
the scrutiny of employment tests whose results differ based on race, 
gender, or ethnicity. Such tests are said to have a disparate impact, and 
their use is illegal unless their validity can be established. Validity means 
that the test is job-related and measures what it purports to measure. 
Further, under Title VII, even a valid employment test with a disparate 
impact could be struck down if less discriminatory alternatives exist.  
Licensing tests, including bar exams, have been found to be outside 
these Title VII protections. But the nondiscrimination values that 
animate Title VII disparate impact analysis for employers apply just as 
fundamentally to attorney licensing through principles of professional 
responsibility and legal ethics. 
This Article examines the civil rights cases from the 1970s that 
established bar examiners’ immunity from Title VII. It then analyzes our 
professional duties of public protection, competence, and 
nondiscrimination that require valid, nondiscriminatory attorney 
licensing tests, suggesting that the Title VII framework be borrowed for 
this purpose. The Article then undertakes that scrutiny, presenting 
evidence of the disparate impact of bar exams and their unproven 
validity, and suggesting feasible, less discriminatory modifications and 
alternatives. In other words, core professional responsibilities require 
consideration and adoption of valid licensing mechanisms that can 
reduce any disparate impact in who we permit to enter our profession, 
and who we exclude. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Valid and nondiscriminatory attorney licensing mechanisms are crucial 
for the legal profession and the public we serve. Valid bar exams   test 
knowledge and skills important for competence as an attorney. 
Nondiscriminatory licensing is necessary to ensure fairness in entry to the 
profession. Yet serious criticism of bar exams on both grounds—
questionable validity and racially disproportionate impact—is widespread 
and persistent. Principles of professional responsibility require us to address 
these enduring problems. Understanding why these issues exist helps to 
identify a meaningful solution. 
Some argue that licensing tests play a protectionist, exclusionary role 
as an effective barrier to entry at the expense of their public protection 
functions of assessing competency in nondiscriminatory ways.1 Lawyers 
justify self-regulation because of our special role as officers of the court and 
defenders of the rule of law,2 but the profession is not immune from capture 
by self-interest, favoring protecting the profession over protecting the 
public.3 
Another explanation for the persistence of such serious flaws in bar 
exams is that attorney licensing as public policy is not well-studied, either 
within or beyond the world of examiners. Led by the National Conference 
of Bar Examiners (“NCBE”), licensers have developed test design and 
psychometric expertise to improve the quality of the questions and the 
reliability of the scores,4 both fundamentally important. But bar examiners 
have not been as ambitious or successful addressing the harder questions of 
aligning licensing to the competencies required for minimal competence in 
today’s profession.5 
Academic attention has also been minimal. Labor and employment law 
scholars do not focus on licensing issues, and licensing is often neglected 
when regulation of attorneys is considered.6 Statements about and study of 
 
1.  See, e.g., RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 62–68, 71–72, 229 (1989).  
2.  See, e.g., GILLIAN K. HADFIELD, RULES FOR A FLAT WORLD: WHY HUMANS INVENTED 
LAW AND HOW TO REINVENT IT FOR A COMPLEX GLOBAL ECONOMY 114–21 (2017). 
3.  See, e.g., ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 72; Richard L. Abel, Lawyer 
Self-Regulation and the Public Interest: A Reflection, 20 LEGAL ETHICS 115, 119 (2017); 
Debra Lyn Bassett, Redefining the “Public” Profession, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 721, 723 (2005). 
4.  These efforts are a regular component of THE BAR EXAMINER, a quarterly publication 
of the National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE), available at 
https://thebarexaminer.org/. 
5.  For a discussion of recent initiatives to address these concerns, see text accompanying 
notes  infra, describing studies recently launched by the NCBE and the State Bar of 
California.  
6.  See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., W. WILLIAM HODES & PETER R. JARVIS, THE LAW 
OF LAWYERING, v. 1 & 2 (4th ed. 2015); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, 
LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2018). But 
see RUSSELL G. PEARCE, DANIEL J. CAPRA, BRUCE A. GREEN, RENEE NEWMAN KNAKE, & 
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professional responsibility and legal ethics have traditionally focused more 
on the responsibilities of the individual attorney to the client than on the 
obligations of the profession.7 A growing army of academic support 
professors work to prepare students to pass bar exams, but very few law 
professors study or write about attorney licensing practices as public 
policy.8 And, of course, most members of the profession are happy to forget 
about bar exams once they have jumped that hurdle, except, perhaps, to 
agree that the barrier remains high for those who follow.9    
The most powerful explanation for persistent weaknesses related to 
disparate impact and validity of attorney licensing may be bar examiners’ 
immunity from Title VII, which can be traced to a handful of cases from the 
1970s. In the decades since, Title VII has remade the workplace by 
requiring countless employers to throw out discriminatory tests that are not 
sufficiently job-related. But the continuing authority of federal appellate 
decisions that dismissed challenges by African Americans to bar exams in 
Southern states has meant that bar examiners—and other professional 
licensing entities—have enjoyed decades of freedom from litigation 
pressure related to validity and disparate impact problems.  
Those early cases in which judges declared bar examiners immune from 
Title VII were based in part on the lofty rhetoric of law as a profession 
dedicated to public protection.  Despite a record showing striking racial 
disparities in bar pass rates, questionable validity, and problematic scoring 
practices, bar examiners successfully defeated the challenges by asserting 
their own good faith and wrapping themselves in the aura of public 
protection. Whether or not Title VII reaches licensers, the same scrutiny 
currently required of employers under Title VII can and should be imposed 
 
LAUREL S. TERRY, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 913–
49 (2d ed. 2014); DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 931–44 (5th ed. 
2009). 
7.  See Bassett, supra note 3, at 723.  
8.  But see Joan W. Howarth & Judith Welch Wegner, Ringing Changes: Systems Thinking 
About Legal Licensing, 13 FIU L. REV. 383, 414 (2019); Andrea Anne Curcio, Carol L. 
Chomsky, & Eileen R. Kaufman, Testing, Diversity & Merit, A Reply to Dan Subotnik and 
Others, 9 U. Mass. L. Rev. 206 (2014) [hereinafter Testing]; Kristin Booth Glen, Thinking 
Out of the Bar Exam Box: A Proposal to “MacCrate” Entry to the Profession, 23 PACE L. 
REV. 343 (2004); Andrea A. Curcio, A Better Bar: Why and How the Existing Bar Exam 
Should Change, 81 NEB. L. REV. 363, 365 (2002); Deborah J. Merritt, Lowell L. Hargens, 
& Barbara F. Reskin, Raising the Bar: A Social Science Critique of Recent Increases to 
Passing Scores on the Bar Exam, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 929, 931–32 (2001) [hereinafter 
Raising the Bar]. 
9.  See STATE BAR OF CAL., FINAL REPORT ON THE 2017 CAL. BAR EXAM STUDIES (2017) 
[hereinafter 2017 CAL. BAR EXAM STUDIES], app. A, tbl. 3, 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/reports/2017-Final-Bar-Exam-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N3N2-3UPN] (showing that 79.8% of the 34,295 attorneys who 
responded to a survey preferred to keep the current cut score, compared to 2.3% of the 
4,188 applicants).   
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on bar examiners pursuant to core principles of professional responsibility.  
Two roads lead to the same destination.  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Parts I and II describe how we got 
to our current problematic position. Part I explains the well-established Title 
VII doctrine that limits the use of discriminatory tests by employers, unions, 
and employment agencies. Part II describes the decisions by which bar 
examiners became immunized from those Title VII requirements. Those 
cases included important but unsuccessful civil rights claims that tell 
compelling stories about a history of disparate impact, questionable 
validity, and indefensible scoring of bar exams.  
Part III argues that even if Title VII does not control, the professional 
responsibility obligations of public responsibility, competence, and 
nondiscrimination require valid, nondiscriminatory attorney licensing tests, 
and that the three-step process of Title VII should be the blueprint for 
licensing scrutiny. In other words, existing ethical principles and 
professional responsibilities require bar examiners and courts to eliminate 
racial and ethnic disparities in licensing tests that are not affirmatively 
shown to be sufficiently job-related or that can be prevented by reasonable 
alternative licensing mechanisms. 
Part IV then applies those professional responsibility obligations to 
scrutinize the licensing process. This Part first describes the disparate 
impact of bar exams.  Then it analyzes the difficulties in establishing job-
relatedness of bar exams. Finally, it explores potentially valid alternatives 
with less discriminatory impact.  
Lastly, the Conclusion reflects on our profession’s willingness to take 
seriously our professed values. 
 
PART I: TITLE VII STRIKES DOWN EMPLOYMENT TESTS THAT COMBINE 
DISPARATE IMPACT WITH INSUFFICIENT VALIDITY OR JOB-RELATEDNESS 
 
Since the landmark 1971 Supreme Court case Griggs v. Duke Power 
Company,10 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act11 has been understood to 
constrain the use of employment tests that have a significant disparate 
impact on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. This 
aspect of Title VII has made it unlawful to use irrelevant test results to 
 
10.  401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
11.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1964). This disparate 
impact theory of liability was subsequently codified in the new section 703(k) of Title VII 
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1991). The Supreme Court 
addressed affirmative action in the context of disparate impact theories in Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (discussed in Testing, supra note 8, at 212–21).  
6  
prevent African Americans from becoming police officers12 or keep women 
from becoming fire fighters with unjustified upper body strength tests.13   
Established Title VII doctrine creates a back-and-forth of shifting 
burdens, depending on the evidence presented.14 First, plaintiffs who are 
challenging an employment test establish a prima facie disparate impact 
claim by demonstrating that the test or other standard, even if facially 
neutral, has a disproportionately adverse effect as to a protected category.15  
What is sufficient to constitute substantial disparate impact to make the 
prima facie case? No “minimal statistical threshold” exists.16  One “rule of 
thumb”17 is the “80% rule” from the Equal Employment Opportunity 
(“EEOC”) Uniform Guidelines that creates a presumption of significant 
disparate impact when the success rate for the protected group is less than 
80% or four-fifths of the success rate for the majority group.18 A showing 
of statistical significance is most useful to establish that the disparities did 
not occur by chance.19 
If the plaintiff meets the burden of proving disparate impact, the burden 
shifts to the defendant employer to “demonstrate that the challenged 
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity.”20 The job-relatedness inquiry is about the validity of 
the test: “Validation is the scientific way of determining whether a selection 
device actually does what it is intended to do: to make reliable and 
meaningful distinctions between individuals on the basis of their ability to 
perform particular tasks with competence and/or to function successfully in 
 
12.  But see Mark S. Brodin, Discriminatory Job Knowledge Tests, Police Promotions, and 
What Title VII Can Learn from Tort Law, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 2319 (2018) (arguing that Title 
VII validity requirements are too diluted to offer adequate protection from discriminatory 
tests).  
13.  See, e.g., Taking the Heat: Gender Discrimination in Firefighting, 17 J. GENDER, SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 713, 719–25 (2009) (transcript of symposium remarks of Title VII plaintiff and 
firefighter Brenda Berkman).  
14.  See BARBARA T. LINDEMANN, PAUL GROSSMAN, & C. GEOFFREY WEIRICH, I 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 2.II.A.1 (5th ed. 2012) [hereinafter LINDEMANN ET 
AL.]. 
15.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(A)(i) (2012). 
16.  Chin v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 685 F.3d 135, 153 (2d 
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1724 (2013); see Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 980 (1988) (case-by-case analysis required, but 
no fixed standard). 
17.  LINDEMANN, supra note 14, at 3.III.A.1.  
18.  29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1, 1607.4(D) (1978). For a discussion applying the 80% rule to 
professional licensing, see S.E. Phillips, Legal Issues in Credentialing Programs, in 
TESTING IN THE PROFESSIONS: CREDENTIALING POLICIES AND PRACTICE (Susan Davis-
Becker & Chad W. Buckendahl, eds., 2017) 228, 231 (citing to § 1607.4D) (“For example, 
if 90% of Whites and 70% of African-Americans pass a credentialing examination, there 
is a presumption of disparate impact because 70% is less than 80% of 90 = 72%”) 
(emphasis in original).   
19.  See, e.g., Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2014). 
20.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(A)(i) (2012). 
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particular jobs.”21 Content validity is established when the test measures the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities of the work the applicant seeks to perform.22 
Over the decades, the requirements of validation pursuant to Title VII 
have become more specific. Courts consider whether an employment test is 
supported by a suitable job analysis,23 shows evidence of competence in test 
construction,24 tests content related to job content,25 tests content 
representative of job content,26 and uses a scoring system that reflects job 
performance.27  
Even if the defendant employer is able to establish that the test is job-
related and consistent with business necessity, plaintiffs may prevail if they 
can prove the existence of “an alternative employment practice” with less 
disparate impact that the employer “refuse[s] to adopt.”28 The EEOC 
Guidelines advise that, “the user should include, as a part of the validity 
study, an investigation of suitable alternative selection procedures and 
suitable alternative methods of using the selection procedure which have as 
little adverse impact as possible.”29  
These are the disparate impact principles that were first established in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Company and later codified in Title VII in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.30 These substantive inquiries—disparate impact, 
validity, and less discriminatory alternatives—are the heart of Title VII law 
and should be equally important for the mechanisms that control access to 
the legal profession.   
 
PART II: THE CASES THAT PROTECTED BAR EXAMS FROM TITLE VII 
SCRUTINY ALSO REVEALED DISPARATE IMPACT AND VALIDITY 
TROUBLES 
 
The protections and processes of Title VII would seem to be highly 
relevant to bar exams, which have persistent disparate results on the basis 
of race and ethnicity, questionable validity, and for which less 
discriminatory alternatives can be pursued. But the validity and job-
relatedness of bar exams have not been seriously challenged in large part 
 
21.  Barbara Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity and Equality, 
1979 SUP. CT. REV. 17, 18 (1979). 
22.  See also LINDEMANN ET AL., supra note 14, at 4.I.3.E.A.  
23.  E.g., Guardians Ass’n of the New York City Police Dep’t., Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 
630 F.2d 79, 95–96 (2d Cir. 1980). 
24.  Id. at 96–97. 
25.  Id. at 97–98. 
26.  Id. at 98–99. 
27.  Id. at 100–06. 
28.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii)(2012). 
29.  29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1998). 
30.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006); see BARBARA T. LINDEMANN, PAUL GROSSMAN, & C. 
GEOFFREY WEIRICH, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 3-2 to 3-14(5th ed. 2012); see 
also Testing, supra note 8, at 214 n.26. 
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because courts have held that the Title VII principles applicable to 
employment tests do not reach licensing exams. Licensing entities currently 
live largely beyond the reach of Title VII because they are not employers, 
unions, or employment agencies as concerns bar applicants.31  
Bar examiners’ immunity from Title VII rests on a collection of cases 
from the 1970s that upheld highly questionable practices of bar examiners 
from Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina, and Virginia against challenges by 
African American applicants.32 Although these cases immunized bar exams 
from Title VII scrutiny, their discussions of both job-relatedness and 
disparate impact are worth our attention. These cases provided bar 
examiners with immunity, but they should not offer bar examiners much 
comfort. 
 
A. TYLER V. VICKERY (1975) 
 
In Tyler v. Vickery,33 a consolidated class action, the Fifth Circuit 
rejected the claims of African Americans who challenged the Georgia bar 
exam on equal protection and due process grounds. The record established 
significant disparate impact in that “[o]n the February and July, 1973, 
administrations, slightly more than one-half the black applicants were 
unsuccessful [] as compared to a failure rate of roughly one-fourth to one-
third among white examinees.”34 All forty African Americans who took the 
July 1972 Georgia bar exam had failed.35   
Affirming summary judgment for the defendant bar examiners, the 
Fifth Circuit panel found no evidence of intentional discrimination, said 
that Title VII did not apply directly because the Georgia bar examiners 
were not an employer, employment agency, or labor organization, and 
refused to import the Title VII disparate impact theory into the 
constitutional equal protection analysis.36  Notably, the court determined 
that “[s]ince it is undisputed that the Georgia bar examination has a greater 
adverse impact on black applicants than on whites and has never been the 
subject of a professional validation study, acceptance of appellants' 
 
31.  See S.E. Phillips, Legal and Ethical Issues, in TESTING IN THE PROFESSIONS: 
CREDENTIALING POLICIES AND PRACTICE (Susan Davis-Becker & Chad W. Buckendahl, 
eds., 2017) at 228, 229–36. But see Ass’n of Mex.-Amer. Educs. (AMAE) v. California, 
231 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Title VII applies to a California teacher licensure 
test). 
32.  For important critique of these and related cases, see Cecil J. Hunt, II, Guests in 
Another’s House: An Analysis of Racially Disparate Bar Performance, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 721, 733–50 (1996).  
33.  517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975). 
34.  Id. at 1092. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. at 1095–96. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), a case about a District 
of Columbia police test with disparate impact against African Americans, the Supreme 
Court held that evidence of intentional discrimination is required to establish an equal 
protection violation.  
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suggested standard of review would inexorably compel the conclusion that 
the examination is unconstitutional.”37  
Finding no intentional discrimination and no fundamental right, the 
court instead used a rational basis standard to uphold the bar exam.38 Under 
that relaxed standard, the court established that the bar exam was valid by 
relying on the fact that the bar examiners designed the test for the purpose 
for which it was used and that they set the passing score (“70”) for that same 
purpose, to determine minimum competency.39 By this standard, bar exams 
are valid so long as bar examiners did not borrow tests originally used for 
some other purpose, such as to license doctors.40  
The Fifth Circuit’s extreme deference to the Georgia bar examiners 
allowed the Court to also reject any problem in the bar examiners’ practice 
of sometimes using the “informal check” of comparing the law school 
grades of applicants whose initial bar exam scores were close to the passing 
line, even though whether to engage in such a review was entirely 
discretionary with a bar examiner, not based on any set standard or score.41   
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the due process claim, determining that  
that the opportunity offered by Georgia to retake the exam was a sufficient 
substitute for any process of review.42 As support, the court cited a law 
review comment for the proposition that even if one in a hundred exams 
were wrongly graded to fail instead of pass, “the probability that the same 
individual would be the victim of error after two reexaminations is literally 
one in a million.”43 Anyone who has even thought about taking a statistics 
course—or who read the Tyler v. Vickery discussion of “Black English”44—
should cringe at this conclusion.  
The plaintiffs in Tyler v. Vickery succeeded only in securing a dissent. 
The dissenting judge agreed with the plaintiffs that the dismissal on 
summary judgment was inappropriate because the question of racial 
motivation was inherently fact-bound.45 Specifically, the dissent noted that 
the testimony of a bar examiner clerk that he maintained the anonymity of 
test-takers during grading and the mixed evidence regarding identifiability 
 
37.  517 F.2d at 1096. 
38.  Id.  at 1102. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id.  
41.  Id. at 1103.  
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. (citing Comment, Review of Failing Bar Examinations: Does Reexamination Satisfy 
Due Process?, 52 BOS. U. L. REV. 286, 301, n. 115. 
44.  Plaintiffs offered a deposition of Dr. J. L. Dillard, a linguist and author of BLACK 
ENGLISH: ITS HISTORY AND USAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1972). Id. at 1094. 
“According to Dr. Dillard, many black persons tend to speak an English variant, 
characterized by structures such as the pre-verbal use of “been”, which has been coined 
Black English.” Id. Dr. Dillard also testified, however, that some White Southerners also 
used that pattern of speech and that expertise was required to determine the difference. 
Id.   
45.  517 F.2d 1089, 1105, (J. Adam, dissenting). 
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of “Black English” made proof of purposeful discrimination difficult, but 
not impossible.46    
The dissent also noticed potential problems with the bar examiners’ 
setting of the cut score. In language equally applicable today, the dissenting 
judge found that “the selection of cut-off scores, especially when such 
selection is not subject to review, may be arbitrary. The legality of such 
decisions may not properly be resolved by mere reference to the good faith 
judgment of the bar examiners.”47 Yet the good faith of bar examiners is 
precisely what supports bar exam cut scores in many jurisdictions today.48 
 
B.  PARRISH V. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF ALABAMA STATE BAR (1976) 
 
Shortly after deciding Vickery, the Fifth Circuit returned to very similar 
issues in Parrish v. Board of Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar.49 
Once again, African American plaintiffs showed evidence of disparate 
impact (over ten administrations, African Americans passed the Alabama 
bar exam at 32% and Whites at 70%)50 of a bar exam that had not been 
validated.51 Following Vickery, once again the court found that the disparate 
impact analysis of Title VII had no application, leaving only constitutional 
challenges to the Alabama bar exam using a highly deferential standard in 
which the lack of validation of the bar exam was irrelevant.52 However, 
Parrish resulted in a narrow victory for the plaintiffs on a discovery issue. 
Over a partial dissent, the court determined that the trial court incorrectly 
granted summary judgment without having ruled on the plaintiff’s motion 
to compel disclosure of the score sheets and grading notes for the February 
1973 exam.53 The Fifth Circuit rejected the bold claim by the bar examiners 
that their own good faith and credibility in denying any wrongdoing made 
the documents irrelevant.54  
 
46.  Id. (J. Adam, dissenting). 
47.  Id. at 1106 (J. Adam, dissenting). 
48.  See, e.g., 2017 CAL. BAR EXAM STUDIES, supra note 9, at 45–46. 
49.  533 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1976). In an earlier stage of the case, the Fifth Circuit had 
upheld denial of the plaintiffs’ motion to recuse the trial judge.  See Parrish v. Brd. of 
Com’rs of St. B. of Alabama, 524 F.2d 98 (1975). The motion to recuse rested on the facts 
that two years previously the trial judge had served as the president of the Montgomery 
Bar Association when its bylaws explicitly excluded African Americans from membership.  
The Fifth circuit rejected the bar association allegation as “essentially an allegation based 
on the judge's background [that] states no specific facts that would suggest he would be 
anything but impartial” and that the “claim of bias is general or impersonal at best.”  524 
F.2d at 101. 
50.  533 F.2d at 944. 
51.  Id. at 947. 
52.  Id. at 949. 
53.  Id. at 946–47. 
54.  The bar examiners asserted the circular argument that the documentation was irrelevant 
because no evidence had contradicted their own “positive affirmation . . . that they were 
not guilty of any improper conduct.” Id. at 947.  
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C.  RICHARDSON V. MCFADDEN (1976, 1977) 
 
In Richardson v. McFadden,55 African American applicants argued that 
their equal protection challenge to the South Carolina bar exam should 
incorporate Title VII’s framework regarding disparate impact and job-
relatedness. Richardson was an important victory for South Carolina’s bar 
examiners with continuing impact today. But the Fourth Circuit in 
Richardson was impressed by neither the validity nor the quality of South 
Carolina’s bar exams.  
Regarding validity, or job-relatedness, plaintiffs argued that the state 
had failed to “demonstrate that the bar examination is job related as opposed 
to simply a measurement of general educational preparation.”56 The 
plaintiffs in Richardson argued that validity could not be sufficiently 
established by reference to law school grades, but that a job analysis was 
required.57 Sadly, this serious criticism of bar exams is still apt. Bar exams 
today largely test knowledge of  first-year subjects and first-year analytical 
skills rather than evaluating the broader range of job-related lawyering 
skills.58 The Richardson plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their challenge, not 
because the Fourth Circuit was impressed by the validity of the exams, but 
because the Court held that Title VII standards did not apply:59  
 
We believe the record is inadequate to demonstrate either “criterion” 
(“predictive”), “content,” or “construct” validity under professionally 
acceptable methods. Thus, if we were to determine that Title VII standards 
were applicable, it would be necessary to reverse and declare the South 
Carolina Bar Examination constitutionally invalid.60  
 
Without the ability to rely on Title VII’s disparate impact theory to 
prove discrimination, the plaintiffs attempted to prove intentional race 
discrimination. They introduced an historic timeline to show a pattern of 
South Carolina bar examiners making major changes to admissions policies 
to shut down access just as African Americans were in a position to use 
those paths into the profession.61 The plaintiffs focused on three policy 
changes: elimination of the diploma privilege, which had provided 
automatic admission to the bar for graduates of the State’s one accredited 
law school; elimination of the option of “reading for the bar”; and 
 
55.  Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1976), on reh'g, 563 F.2d 1130 (4th 
Cir. 1977). 
56.  Id. at 746. 
57.  Id. at 748.   
58.  For related criticism, see Howarth & Wegner, supra note 8, at 426 (bar exam tests 
mainly first-year subjects and skills).    
59.  Richardson, 540 F.2d at 748. 
60.  Id. at 746–47 (citation omitted). 
61.  See id. at 747. 
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abolishment of reciprocity. Plaintiffs produced evidence that South 
Carolina eliminated its diploma privilege “in 1950, three years (the normal 
law school term) after a ‘separate but equal’ law school was started at South 
Carolina State College, a black school.”62  “Reading law” was  “eliminated 
in 1957, ‘coincidentally’ shortly after a black applicant used this method.”63 
Reciprocity was “abolished in January 1972, not long after a black member 
of the Oklahoma Bar applied under the reciprocity rule.”64 The court found 
this evidence circumstantial and not sufficient to prove intentional 
discrimination.65  
Having failed in their claim of intentional discrimination, the plaintiffs 
sought to prove that the licensing test did not bear “a fair and substantial 
relationship” to the determination of minimal competency as a lawyer.66 As 
with respect to validity, the Fourth Circuit expressed little confidence in the 
South Carolina bar examiners’ methods of determining their cut score or of 
scoring individual exams.67 Witheringly, the Fourth Circuit described the 
evidence introduced to validate the cut score as “very subjective and general 
in nature and hardly acclaimed by the educational testing experts who 
testified.”68 
The court appeared even less impressed by methods used to score bar 
exams, which it described in detail. The court recounted the testimony of 
two examiners, one who appeared to read the whole exam and assign an 
overall grade, the other who assigned points for individual sections. The 
first described his grading method as assigning a number grade based on the 
“totality” of multiple questions and “the student’s evidence of ability in 
answering the whole.”69 He explained that he did not use a point system, 
but, instead: 
 
It is a matter, in the preliminary process, of giving a mental assessment of 
importance to this question, or lesser importance to this question, or lesser 
importance to that question. When I have finished grading a paper, what I 
would have is one grade that I put on there.70  
 
62.  Id. (parenthetical in original).  
63.  Id. at 746. For a history of the law school at South Carolina State College, see Alfred 
D. Moore III, Turning the Tide of Segregation: The Legacy of the Law School at the South 
Carolina State College, J. OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 7, 2017),  available at  
https://www.jbhe.com/2017/09/turning-the-tide-of-segregation-the-legacy-of-the-law-
school-at-south-carolina-state-college/ [https://perma.cc/7QXZ-MAFV] (last visited Apr. 
8, 2020).  
64.  Richardson, 540 F.2d at 747.  
65.  Id. at 747–48. 
66.  Id. at 749. 
67.  The court acknowledged that “[w]hether the passing score selected by the Bar 
Examiners bears ‘a fair and substantial relationship’ to the determination of minimal 
competency presents a much more difficult question.” Id.  
68.  Id.  
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. at 749–50. 
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Surprisingly, the Fourth Circuit found this “[p]erhaps the testimony most 
supportive of the validity of the cut-off score.”71 
The court explained that other examiners “employed a very mechanical 
system, assigning points to particular parts of questions, summing those 
points, and then in some cases obtaining the 70 cut-off line simply by raising 
the highest score to an ‘A’ or perfect score.”72 The court was not impressed 
by these methods, declaring that “[w]e tend to agree with appellants' expert 
that, if this second system is utilized in the precise manner described by the 
Bar Examiners, it would be almost a matter of pure luck if the ‘70’ thereby 
derived corresponded with anybody's judgment of minimal competency.”73  
The court’s deference to the examiners was so great that “almost a 
matter of pure luck” was deemed sufficient. In essence, the court could not 
see any greater accuracy from either of the two contrasting grading 
methods:  
 
[A]bsent professionally validated, administered, and evaluated 
examinations, it is not clear that to require grading along the lines 
discussed by [the gestalt examiner] rather than the more mechanical and 
arbitrary method […] is anything more or less than to demand greater 
subjectivity. It is not at all certain which of these two, both of whom are 
competent lawyers but laymen at question design and evaluation, 
generates numerical scores which more accurately reflect their ‘true’ 
evaluation of competency.74  
 
71.  Id. at 749. The court’s full description of this scoring method is worth considering:  
My own approach is that, preliminary to the grading process, to go back to the 
exam question and in studying through them very carefully, I make a mental 
assessment of the importance to be attached to each one. I do not go through, for 
my own purposes: I feel that it's a mechanical process of assigning a point value 
to each question. I then read the examinations. I treat them not as questions to 
which so may [sic] points were assigned to this or to that issue of this question, 
but as a totality and assign to that paper a grade which I think is reflective of the 
student's evidence of ability in answering the whole. 
Q. What form would that grade take, a letter grade? 
A. It would be a numerical grade. And I think, for my own testing purposes, the 
magic passing point is 70, and I range upward or downward through that. 
Q. All right sir, as I understand it, you read the entire paper and then assign a 
single numerical grade, with 70 as passing? 
A. That is right. 
Q. As I understand it, you don't attempt to assign points to any particular portion 
of the test? 
A. Not in a numerical fashion. It is a matter, in the preliminary process, of giving 
a mental assessment of importance to this question, or lesser importance to this 
question, or lesser importance to that question. When I have finished grading a 
paper, what I would have is one grade that I put on there.  
Id. at, 749–50.  
72.  Id. at 750.  
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. 
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Ironically, these questionable methods of grading bar exam essays and 
performance tests probably continue today in part because of these 
decisions from the 1970s that combined rhetorical critique of the examiners’ 
methods with a legal affirmation and shield from Title VII.  
After having noted that the examiners were not trained in test design, 
the Fourth Circuit upheld the tests because the bar exams were designed and 
scored by the bar examiners for the right purpose: “In view of the fact that 
all Examiners both designed their exams and assigned scores so as to 
indicate their judgment as to minimal competency, we cannot find the 
results obtained so unrelated to the State's objectives as to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.”75 Good faith controlled. 
In addition to the claims made by the class of plaintiffs, two individual 
plaintiffs used a chart of borderline scores and pass or fail results to argue 
that the results as to them were arbitrary and capricious.76  Their claims did 
not challenge the method by which their exams were scored, because each 
person was failed in spite of having apparently achieved the points required 
to pass. Specifically, these two plaintiffs argued that each had met or 
exceeded the required score of 70 because they had scored 70.5 and 69.6 
respectively, and the bar examiners standard practices included “rounding 
up.”77  
The court was not persuaded by the bar examiners’ attempts to justify 
and reconcile the apparent inconsistency with which borderline cases were 
treated. The examiners asserted that an applicant could “fail” the bar exam, 
even with a cumulative passing score, based on ‘‘‘the configuration of 
scores' and Examiners' notes containing remarks on the general quality of 
papers” without any further review of the actual exam papers.78 But the 
 
75.  Id. 
76.  “Kelly and Spain base their case on the following table of examination scores: 
Applicant Scores for each  6 examiners Average Pass/Fail 
--------- --------------------------- ------- ---------           
# 160 June, 
1971 
 66 67 68 71 78 81 71.8 Fail 
# 128 June, 
1970 
 66 67 67 72 75 79 71.0 Pass 
Spain June, 
1971 
 66 66 68 71 72 80 70.5 Fail 
# 121 June, 
1969 
 66 69 F(69) 71 73 73.8 70.3 Pass 
Kelly Feb., 
1971 
 63.5  66 69 + 70 71 78 69.6 Fail 
# 17  Feb., 
1970    
 60 67 71 72 73 74 69.5 Fail 
# 10  Feb., 
1971 
 63 66 70 71 73 73 69.3 Pass 
Id. at 750–51. 
77.  Id. at 751. 
78.  Id. 
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court found that the bar examiners’ explanations of their judgments about 
“the configuration of scores” did not actually explain the results on the chart 
and that “there [was] no consistently applied distinction between them.”79  
The more the examiners attempted to describe their methods, the more 
arbitrary they appeared. The examiners explained at oral argument that two 
candidates with identical scores could pass and fail, or a candidate with a 
lower score could pass and one with a higher score fail,  based on the 
“written comments [that] often accompany borderline scores and are 
employed to make these difficult decisions.”80   
The court was skeptical about the bar examiners’ justification for 
having passed one applicant and failed another with an identical score:  
 
The one who passed failed three Examiners and, in addition, failed the 
Multistate portion of the exam. The one who failed it also failed three 
Examiners but passed the Multistate portion. The Examiners told us that 
this was perfectly reasonable because comments on the grading sheets 
corresponded with the ultimate results. The one who failed was noted to 
be ‘poor in expressing himself’ and ‘didn't seem to have an understanding 
of legal principles.’ The one who passed was ‘marginal plus’ and ‘had 
some good answers.’81  
 
The Fourth Circuit found this reliance on comments to be 
“irreconcilable” with the examiners’ claims about the precision of their 
numerical scores: “It is not possible to pursue the goal of objectivity and 
also put ultimate reliance on subjective notes as general and vague as 
those.”82 The trial court concluded that “the correspondence of a score of 
70 with even their own judgment of minimal competency was little more 
than fortuitous” and found in favor of the two individual plaintiffs on the 
basis of arbitrary and capricious scoring that violated due process and equal 
protection.83  
In its first consideration of this case, the Fourth Circuit agreed and 
ordered that the matter be remanded to the district court to certify the 
 
79.  “But, appellants point out, individuals who had lower cumulative totals and not 
obviously different “configuration of scores” were passed. As to Spain, the Examiners' 
basic response is that one cannot expect perfection in the difficult borderline cases. As to 
Kelly, they argue that no one who failed three Examiners had a lower score and was judged 
to have passed the exam. They contend that individual # 10 “passed because he passed four 
examiners,” indicating that passing would be automatic in such situations. Brief for 
Appellee at 63 n.37. That, at least, was their response before applicant # 17 was brought to 
their attention. He passed four Examiners, had a higher cumulative score than # 10, and 
still failed the examination.” Id. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. at 751–52. 
82.  Id.  
83.  Id. at 751. 
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admission to the South Carolina bar of the two African-American men who 
had scored 70.5 and 69.6.84 
That sole victory from the Fourth Circuit was short-lived. On rehearing 
en banc, the Court reversed that portion of the decision. Instead the Court 
affirmed the district court that had denied relief, differing on whether the 
federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction (deferring to the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina’s authority over bar admission) or whether the 
claim had not been established.85 The court seemed to say that proof that 
two defendants failed two plaintiffs who should have been passed was an 
insufficient basis for any remedy: 
 
Significant also, with respect to Spain and Kelly, are the facts that of the 
aggregate 828 examinations given during the eight times that the bar 
examination was administered over a four-year period, only these two 
examples of alleged discrimination were proved, and that Spain and Kelly 
continued to fail on subsequent reexaminations. Succinctly stated, we 
simply do not think that Spain and Kelly proved their case.86  
 
Richardson v. McFadden stands for the principle that claims of racial bias 
in bar exams require proof of intentional discrimination, scrutiny,87 but it 
should also be remembered as a Fourth Circuit decision that prevented two 
African American men from being admitted to practice law in South 
Carolina because each passed the bar exam only once.  
 
D.  WOODARD V. VIRGINIA BOARD. OF BAR EXAMINERS (1979) 
 
The circuit decision that may be cited most often for the principle that 
bar examiners are not subject to Title VII is Woodard v. Virginia Board  of 
Bar Examiners,88 a 1979 Fourth Circuit per curiam opinion that upheld two 
district court rulings in favor of Virginia’s bar examiners. In the first district 
court decision, the court ruled that Title VII did not apply to bar examiners 
because they were not employers within the meaning of the statute. Faced 
with Title VII authority that seemed to have expanded its reach beyond 
traditional employers, the district court distinguished bar exams:  
 
The EEOC guidelines in this area were developed in the context of 
traditional employment practices. The employment tests utilized in the 
 
84.  Id. at 751–52. 
85.  Richardson v. McFadden, 563 F.2d 1130, 1130–32 (4th Cir. 1977). 
86.  Id. at 1132 (emphasis added). 
87.  See Pettit v. Ginerich, 582 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam decision rejecting 
claims of seven African American applicants to the bar in Maryland based on 
Richardson); see also Delgado v. McTighe, 522 F.Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (upholding 
Pennsylvania bar exams as “neutral on their face and rationally serv[ing] the purpose for 
which they have been designed,” id. at 894–95, and noting that Richardson upheld bar 
exam essay questions with no model answer and multiple grading methods, id. at 897).   
88.  See generally Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of B. Exam’rs, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1979). 
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industrial setting are designed to measure an individual's ability to perform 
certain limited functions or operate particular machinery. The bar 
examination, however, serves a much broader purpose.89  
 
In this way, the court explicitly drew on the profession’s public role to 
justify immunity from Title VII.  
After denying the plaintiff’s efforts to certify a class, in its second 
opinion the district court held, following Richardson, that the court had no 
subject matter jurisdiction because the case sought to challenge an 
individual’s results, a matter for which only the Virginia Supreme Court or 
the U.S. Supreme Court had jurisdiction.90  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit issued a one-page per curiam opinion that 
upheld the district court decisions against the plaintiff. Following Vickery, 
the Fourth Circuit held that governmental licensing boards are not 
employers and therefore, are not covered by Title VII.91 Following a 
concurrence in Richardson, the Fourth Circuit found no subject-matter 
jurisdiction.92 The court affirmed the denial of class action status without 
any discussion or citation.93  
 
E.  LIMITING THE OUTSIZED IMPACT OF VICKERY, PARRISH, RICHARDSON, AND WOODARD. 
 
Litigation that challenges bar examiners’ immunity from Title VII 
based on these cases could be important, and analogous claims may exist 
under state nondiscrimination statutes and constitutions. But that is not my 
purpose here. My argument is that the legal profession’s rules of 
professional responsibility require a showing of validity and job-relatedness 
whenever bar exams have a disparate impact, and the simple structure 
established for Title VII cases can be borrowed for such inquiries.  
PART III: PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIRES SCRUTINY OF THE 
VALIDITY OF AND ALTERNATIVES TO ANY LICENSING TESTS WITH DISPARATE 
IMPACT. 
 
Attorney licensing authorities should not continue to exploit the gap in 
Title VII created by Vickery, Parrish, Richardson, and Woodard, which has 
permitted bar exams to avoid legal scrutiny related to the lethal combination 
of disparate impact and unproven validity that stain bar exams.   
One theme of the Title VII disparate impact cases is that unlawful 
discrimination can exist even without any intent to discriminate. Good faith 
and good intentions are no defense.  Similarly, using unvalidated bar exams 
 
89.  Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of B. Exam’rs, 420 F. Supp. 211, 214 (E.D. Va. 
1976), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).  
90.  Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 454 F. Supp. 4, 5. (E.D. Va. 1978). 
91.  598 F.2d 1345.   
92.  Id. at 1345, n.1. 
93.  Id. at 1346.   
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with known disparate impact violates ethical requirements related to public 
interest, competency, and non-discrimination. Good faith, best intentions, 
and hard work by bar examiners should not be sufficient to allow disparate 
bar passage rates to continue without serious scrutiny of the job-relatedness 
and business necessity of bar exams and investigation of less discriminatory 
alternatives. Professional responsibility for public protection, competence, 
and non-discrimination support the need for valid, nondiscriminatory bar 
exams, even in the absence of Title VII enforcement.  
 
A.   PUBLIC PROTECTION.  
 
Bar examiners and state supreme courts are correctly emphatic that their 
core responsibility in licensing is to protect the public.94 Bar examiners 
claim that specific role in the context of the entire profession’s duties to the 
public. The Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct describes 
a lawyer as “an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having 
special responsibility for the quality of justice.”95 Further, “[a]s  a public 
citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal 
system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by 
the legal profession.”96 Licensing, as an aspect of attorney regulation, 
should be undertaken in the public interest because  “[a] lawyer should … 
help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.”97 
Some states have codified the organized bar’s obligation to protect the 
public. For example, California’s Business & Professional Code establishes 
that, “Protection of the public, which includes support for greater access to, 
 
94.  See, e.g., Judith A. Gunderson, President’s Page, 87 BAR EXAM’R (Winter 2018–19) 
(“By their very nature and purpose (public protection), licensing exams like the bar exam 
must be crafted to ensure that those who obtain the professional license can safely practice 
in their chosen field”);, Our Mission: What We Do, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/Our-Mission [https://perma.cc/Q3RC-3RHP]) (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2020) (“The State Bar of California’s mission is to protect the public 
and includes the primary functions of licensing, regulation and discipline of attorneys; the 
advancement of the ethical and competent practice of law; and support of efforts for greater 
access to, and inclusion in, the legal system”); RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW IN COLORADO, PREAMBLE TO CHAPS. 8–12, available at 
https://www.coloradosupremecourt.com/PDF/BLE/201%20-
%20Rules%20Governing%20Admission%20to%20Practice%20Law%20in%20Colorado
.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD97-RPY6] (“In regulating the practice of law in Colorado in the 
public interest, the Court’s objectives include . . . .”); VIRGINIA BRD. OF BAR EXAMINERS, 
CODE OF CONDUCT, available at https://barexam.virginia.gov/code.html 
[https://perma.cc/D77V-V9BM]). (“our top priority is to protect the public”) (). 
95.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities, para. 1 
(2018) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].  
96.  Id., at para. 6.  
97.  Id. “The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of 
self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are 
conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested 
concerns of the bar.” Id. at para. 12.  
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and inclusion in, the legal system, shall be the highest priority for the State 
Bar of California and the board of trustees in exercising their licensing, 
regulatory, and disciplinary functions.”98  
The principle of public protection means that licensing requirements 
should be valid, that is, closely related to competency as a new attorney. 
The commitment to public protection also means that licensing 
requirements should protect the entire public, including fair access to the 
profession for qualified candidates from diverse communities. The legal 
profession protects the diverse public better if it is itself diverse.99  
 
B.   COMPETENCE 
 
Any professional licensing test should protect members of the public 
by ensuring that new members of the profession possess minimal 
competence to practice that profession.100 Thus the purpose of bar exams is 
to ensure that new lawyers are minimally competent to practice law.101 A 
test is valid if it tests what it purports to test.102 A test that bears a weak 
relationship to actual competence is not valid.  Bar exams are valid, then, 
when they do a good job of distinguishing between applicants who are 
barely minimally competent to practice law and those who are below that 
standard.  
Competency is also the underlying professional responsibility 
requirement that justifies bar exams in the first place.103 A lawyer cannot 
take on representation for which he or she is not competent.104 Under the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the first duty owed by the lawyer to 
the client is competence. Rule 1.1 provides that, “A lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the 
 
98.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6001.1 (2019). 
99.  For one of many examples, clients of color may have difficulty finding attorneys of 
color to whom they can relate. See Amy Myrick, Robert L. Nelson, & Laura Beth Nielsen, 
Race and Representation: Disparities in Representation for Employment Civil Rights 
Plaintiffs, 15 LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 705, 723 (2012).  
100. See, e.g., Brian E. Clauser, Melissa J. Margolis, & Susan M. Case, Testing for 
Licensure and Certification in the Professions, in NAT’L. COUNCIL ON MEASUREMENT IN 
EDUC. & AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT 720 (Robert L. Brennan 
ed., 4th ed., 2006). 
101.  See, e.g., Michael T. Kane, The Role of Licensure Tests, 74 B. EXAM’R. 27 (2005). 
102. See AM. EDUC. RES. ASS’N, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, & NAT’L COUNCIL ON 
MEASUREMENT IN EDUC., STANDARDS FOR EDUC. AND PSYCHOL. TESTING 11 (2014) 
[hereinafter STANDARDS, 2014]. For a discussion of credentialing tests including tests for 
professional licensure, see id. at 174–78, 181–83. 
103.  For a discussion of various understandings of competency that complicate attorney 
licensure, see Howarth & Wegner, supra note 8, at 398–406. 
104.  MODEL RULES R. 1.16, cmt. 1 (“A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter 
unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest 
and to completion.”).  
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legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary 
for the representation.”105   
The Model Rules do not tell us much about what competence looks like, 
beyond this general description that rests on “reasonably necessary” 
knowledge and skills. But hints exist. Perhaps oddly in this age of 
specialization, the Comment to Rule 1.1 suggests that the default 
requirement for competence in many situations means the “proficiency of a 
general practitioner.”106 The Comment also identifies “some important 
legal skills” including “the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence 
and legal drafting” that are “required in all legal problems.”107 The 
Comment identifies issue spotting (“determining what kind of legal 
problems a situation may involve”) as “[p]erhaps the most fundamental 
legal skill,” a “skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized 
knowledge.”108 This central professional responsibility principle of 
“competence” requires licensing requirements to measure competence in 
order to be valid. 
 
C.   NONDISCRIMINATION 
 
The legal profession has also adopted various principles, rules, and even 
statutory obligations related to nondiscrimination, diversity, and inclusion, 
many of which are directly relevant to the problems of disparate racial and 
ethnic impact of bar exams. 
Since 2008, the American Bar Association has included as one of its 
four goals to “Eliminate Bias and Enhance Diversity,” which includes two 
“objectives”: “1. Promote full and equal participation in the association, our 
profession, and the justice system by all persons” and “2. Eliminate bias in 
the legal profession and the justice system.”109 Both objectives are 
undermined by licensing tests that disproportionately prevent potential 
attorneys of color from becoming licensed.  
More recently, in 2016 the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were 
amended to explicitly prohibit discrimination.110 Rule 8.4 now defines as 
 
105.  MODEL RULES R. 1.1.  
106.  MODEL RULES R. 1.1 cmt. 1. 
107.  MODEL RULES R. 1.1 cmt. 2. 
108.  MODEL RULES R. 1.1, cmt. 2. The Comment also reminds us that, “[a] lawyer can 
provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.” Id. 
109.  ABA Mission and Goals, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/aba-mission-goals/ [https://perma.cc/33BS-
3MTJ] (last visited Mar. 14, 2020); see Stephen Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias and 
Harassment in Law Practice: A Guide for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 201–02 & n. 25 (2017) [hereinafter A Rule to Forbid Bias].    
110.  See Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias, supra note 113, at 196–197; Kristine A. Kubes, 
Cara D. Davis & Mary E. Schwind, The Evolution of Model Rule 8.4 (g): Working to 
Eliminate Bias, Discrimination, and Harassment in the Practice of Law, A.B.A. (2019), 
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professional misconduct conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know is discrimination related to the practice of law.111 Specifically, 
under the Model Rules it is now professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
 
(g) engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know 
is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, 
national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the 
practice of law.112 
  
By its express terms, this prohibition on discrimination is not limited to 
work with clients but extends to other activities “related to the practice of 
law.”113 That certainly should include admissions activities determining 
access to the profession.  
Importantly, the Comment to the Rule tells us to interpret the Rule’s 
meaning by looking at substantive antidiscrimination law: “The substantive 
law of anti-discrimination and anti-harassment statutes and case law may 
guide application of paragraph (g).”114 Thus, even though Title VII by its 
own terms has been held not to reach attorney licensing, Rule 8.4(g) 
suggests that the legal profession should borrow the methods and 
approaches of Title VII to ensure that its admissions practices are 
nondiscriminatory.    
The Model Rules are not the only source of ethical or professional 
responsibility obligations related to nondiscrimination in attorney licensing 
tests. California, again, recently added explicit statutory recognition that the 
State Bar’s obligation to protect the public includes improved access to and 
inclusion in the profession.115 The Colorado Supreme Court, as another 
example, has adopted the explicit purpose of “[p]romoting diversity, 
inclusion, equality and freedom from discrimination” as one of its 
objectives “in regulating the practice of law in Colorado in the public 
 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/construction_industry/publications/under_constructi
on/2019/spring/model-rule-8-4/ [https://perma.cc/UJ2Q-FKNR].  
111.  MODEL RULES R. 8.4(g). 
112.  Id.   
113.  MODEL RULES R. 8.4 cmt. 4. Some states have rejected or modified Model Rule 
8.4(g). For example, California apparently adopted a more limited version of Rule 8.4.1 
that prohibits discrimination “in representing a client” or in “law firm operations.” See 
CAL. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 8.4.1 (approved by the Supreme Court, Effective 
November 1, 2018) (“(a) In representing a client, or in terminating or refusing to accept 
the representation of any client, a lawyer shall not: (1) unlawfully harass or unlawfully 
discriminate against persons* on the basis of any protected characteristic; or (2) unlawfully 
retaliate against persons. (b) In relation to a law firm’s operations . . . .”).  
114.  MODEL RULES R. 8.4 cmt. 3.  
115.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF’L CODE § 6001.1. “Protection of the public, which includes 
support for greater access to, and inclusion in, the legal system, shall be the highest priority 
for the State Bar of California and the board of trustees in exercising their licensing, 
regulatory, and disciplinary functions..” Id. (emphasis added) (the emphasized clause was 
added by Stats. 2018, c. 659 (A.B.3249), § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.). 
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interest.”116 Disparate impact of the bar exam would be evidence that these 
goals of inclusion and nondiscrimination are not being accomplished.  
 
D.   FROM RHETORIC TO OVERSIGHT 
 
Oversight matters. The persistent problems of attorney licensing have 
flourished in the absence of meaningful statutory or constitutional 
oversight. But well-established principles of professional responsibility and 
legal ethics also provide a mandate for scrutiny of licensing mechanisms 
that disproportionately prevent admission on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
gender, and other protected classes.117 The privilege of self-regulation 
carries the responsibility to exercise that regulation in a manner that is 
aligned with the profession’s stated goals. Therefore, even without Title 
VII, attorney licensing tests that disproportionately exclude protected 
groups must be shown to be job-related, and less discriminatory alternatives 
pursued by the bar as if Title VII applied.  
 
PART IV: PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LICENSING SCRUTINY: 
DISPARATE IMPACT; VALIDITY; LESS DISCRIMINATORY ALTERNATIVES 
 
Our professional obligations to protect the public by ensuring 
competence with non-discriminatory entrance requirements should be met 
with the same three-step scrutiny already well-established by Title VII for 
employment tests,118 which could be called professional responsibility 
licensing scrutiny. Does the test have a disparate impact?  If so, can the 
testers demonstrate sufficient job-relatedness (validity)? Even if a test with 
disparate impact is shown to be valid, is there a less discriminatory 
alternative with equal (or greater) validity?  
 
116.  See RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN COLO., Pmbl. to Chs 
18–20 (“In regulating the practice of law in Colorado in the public interest, the 
Court’s objectives include: . . . Promoting diversity, inclusion, equality and freedom from 
discrimination in the delivery of legal services and the administration of justice . . . .”) 
(adopted and effective Apr. 7, 2016), available at 
https://www.coloradosupremecourt.com/PDF/BLE/201%20-
%20Rules%20Governing%20Admission%20to%20Practice%20Law%20in%20Colorado
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HUE-YUEZ].  
117.  Gender differences related to bar exam test components are also well-established. 
See, e.g., Susan M. Case, Men and Women: Differences in Performance on the MBE, 74 
B. EXAM’R 44, 44 (May 2006) (“men outperform women on the MBE by about 5 points”); 
RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, NCBE, IMPACT OF ADOPTION OF THE UNIFORM BAR 
EXAMINATION IN NEW YORK 117–24 (2019), available at 
https://www.nybarexam.org/UBEReport/NY%20UBE%20Adoption%20Part%202%20St
udy.pdf (showing that men performed better on the MBE than women and also on the 
overall exam). Because men outscore women on the MBE, while women score better than 
men on the essays, decisions to give greater weight to the MBE and less to the essays are 
knowingly hurting women. My focus here, however, is race and ethnicity, where bar 
passage differences are more dramatic.  
118.  See supra text accompanying notes ___. 
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A.   DISPARATE IMPACT 
 
The well-known and widely decried lack of diversity of the legal 
profession119 has many causes, one of which is disparate results on our 
licensing tests.120 Evidence of the disparate impact of bar exams is 
overwhelming. Many jurisdictions do not disclose bar passage rates by race 
or ethnicity, but the available information reveals persistent significant 
racial and ethnic disparities in bar exam passage.  
 
I.    DISPARATE IMPACT IS ESTABLISHED 
 
The most complete demographic information comes from California, 
which is unusual in that it provides race and ethnicity bar exam passage 
rates for every administration of its bar exam.121 These results demonstrate 
persistent, consistent disparities based on race and ethnicity. For example, 
the Table 1 lists the first-time July pass rates for graduates of California 
 
119.  See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Law Is the Least Diverse Profession in the Nation. And 
Lawyers Are Not Doing Enough to Change That., WASH. POST (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/27/law-is-the-least-diverse-
profession-in-the-nation-and-lawyers-arent-doing-enough-to-change-that/ 
[https://perma.cc/H6NZ-WBRG]. For further analysis, see Jason P. Nance & Paul E. 
Madsen, An Empirical Analysis of Diversity in the Legal Profession, 47 CONN. L. REV. 
271, 305–13 (2014) (providing data comparing diversity of legal profession with diversity 
of other prestigious professions). For updated data, see information collected by the 
American Bar Association, showing that in 2018, the legal profession was composed of 
3% Asians, 5% Hispanics, 5% Blacks, and 85% Whites. See Am. Bar Ass’n, ABA 
NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY (2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/National_
Lawyer_Population_Demographics_2008-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/LB57-ENKK].  
120.  See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Knots in the Pipeline for Prospective Lawyers of Color: 
The LSAT is Not the Problem and Affirmative Action is Not the Answer, 24 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 379, 405 (2013) (“Almost all would agree that the individual state bar 
examinations act as a severe impediment to certain members of underrepresented minority 
groups becoming practicing attorneys”); Glen, supra note 8, at 381–83 (discussing studies 
showing white applicants’ bar passage rates were 30% higher than black applicants’ bar 
passage rates); id. at 508–10 (discussing New York State Evaluation from 1992 showing 
similar pattern). Due to disparate impact concerns, American Bar Association entities 
focused on diversity have actively opposed efforts to ratchet up the bar pass rates required 
for law schools to retain ABA accreditation. See, e.g., Letter from Chairs of the ABA Goal 
III Entities in Response to Standard 316 (Jan. 11, 2019),  
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admi
ssions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/feb19/3-aba-diversity-entities-
response-to-standard-316.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5UX-T5DM].  
121.  See STATE BAR OF CAL., CAL. BAR EXAM STATISTICS, 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Admissions/Law-School-Regulation/Exam-Statistics 
[https://perma.cc/AM6T-33N8]. 
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ABA accredited law schools in 2018, 2017, and 2016, broken down by 
ethnicity.122  
 
Table 1: First time pass rates for graduates of California ABA 
accredited law schools 
 
 Asian Black Hispanic White Other 
Minority 
July 
2018 
66.4%  45.1%  56.3%  69.5%, 47.8%  
July 
2017 
69.7%, 48.9% 57.1% 75.1% 64.7% 
July 
2016 
57.7% 42.3% 51.9% 69.3% 52.1% 
 
 
The results for graduates of ABA accredited law schools from outside 
California, contained in Table 2, for the same years show the same 
pattern.123 The older statistics posted going back to 2006 show the same 
disparate results.124  
 
 
Table 2: First time pass rates for graduates of ABA accredited law 
schools from outside California 
 
 Asian Black Hispanic White Other 
Minority 
July 
2018 
54.8%  25%  44.7% 67.5%  52.9%  
July 
2017 
69.8% 44.8% 52.5% 74% 59.5% 
July 
2016 
57.9% 22.2% 53.4% 67.9%; 47.9%. 
 
 
Reports that have been occasionally released for New York bar exam 
pass rates also show wide disparities. The most recent statistics come from 
 
122.  See STATE BAR OF CAL., CAL. BAR EXAM STATISTICS, 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Admissions/Law-School-Regulation/Exam-Statistics 
[https://perma.cc/AM6T-33N8]. 
123.  See STATE BAR OF CAL., CAL. BAR EXAM STATISTICS, 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Admissions/Law-School-Regulation/Exam-Statistics 
[https://perma.cc/AM6T-33N8]. Pass rates for February administrations and for graduates 
of California Accredited and Non-accredited law schools are similar. Id.  
124.  Id. 
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New York’s report on test results for the five administrations from July 
2015 to July 2017, a report that studied the impact of New York’s adoption 
of the Uniform Bar Exam (“UBE”) in July 2016.125 Disparate results 
preceded and followed adoption of the UBE. Table 3 details that for each of 
the five bar exam administrations studied, for both all test-takers and 
domestic, first time test-takers, the pass rate for Caucasian/White was above 
the overall average. 126 The pass rate for each of the minority categories was 
below the average.127 The statistics for the same administrations for 
domestic-educated, first time takers, listed in Table 4, were similar.128  
 
 
Table 3: New York Overall Bar Passage Rates 
 
 Caucasian/
White 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander 
Black/African 
American 
Hispanic/ 
Latino 
July 2015 75.2% 44.6% 41.0% 48.2% 
July 2016 76.3% 51.0% 39.6% 53.8% 
July 2017 79.6% 60.4% 48.6% 57.1% 
 
 
Table 4: New York Domestic-Educated, First Time Takers Bar 
Passage Rates 
 
 Caucasian/
White 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander 
Black/African 
American 
Hispanic/ 
Latino 
July 2015 85.1% 73.0% 58.6% 65.6% 
July 2016 87.5% 81.5% 57.8% 73.0% 
July 2017 90.1% 85.0% 65.8% 77.6% 
 
 
These disparities would establish the need for further scrutiny if Title 
VII applied.129 
These disparate results are not new.130 An earlier NCBE report 
analyzing the 2006 New York results explained that, of domestic-educated 
first-time bar exam takers, “[t]he Caucasian/White group had an average 
total score of about 720, the Asian/Pacific Islander group had an average 
total score of about 703, the Hispanic/Latino group had an average total 
 
125.  See NCBE, IMPACT OF N.Y. UBE ADOPTION, supra note 121.  
126.  See NCBE, IMPACT OF N.Y. UBE ADOPTION, supra note 121, at 149 (Table 4.2.16). 
127.  Id.  
128.  See NCBE, IMPACT OF N.Y. UBE ADOPTION, supra note 121, at 166 (Table 4.2.24). 
129.  See supra text accompanying notes __ (describing proof of disparities under Title 
VII).  
130.  See supra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing Title VII cases from the 1970s 
concerning disparate racial impact of bar exams).  
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score of about 682, and the Black/African American group had an average 
total score of about 671,”131 disparities the authors described as “large.”132 
NCBE researchers also undertook a national study of racial and ethnic 
disparities, which showed that the average 2006 MBE score for Whites 
was 149.3, for Asians was 146.1, for Hispanics was 143.3, and for Blacks 
was 137.9.133 These substantial disparities were described as consistent 
with studies from New York and Texas.134  
The most authoritative national bar passage study was prepared by 
Linda F. Wightman for the Law School Admissions Council in the 
1990’s.135 Based on 23,086 test-takers, the Wightman study showed first-
time bar passage rates of 91.93% for Whites, 61.40% for Blacks, 66.36% 
for Native Americans, 75.88% for Mexican Americans, 74.81% for 
Hispanics, and 80.75% for Asian Americans.136 Although Wightman’s 
analyses are more than two decades old, more recent analyses have shown 
little change in racial disparities.137 
 
II.   CUT SCORE DECISIONS CAN EXACERBATE DISPARATE IMPACT WHILE 
UNDERMINING VALIDITY. 
 
The science of testing has led professional licensers—of nurses, 
engineers, dentists, and others—to use a single, professionally developed 
multiple choice test as the anchor for those professions’ assessment of 
minimal competence.138 For the legal profession in the United States, this 
function is performed by the NCBE’s Multistate Bar Exam (“MBE”).139 But 
 
131.  See ANDREW MROCH ET AL., NCBE, IMPACT OF THE INCREASE IN THE PASSING SCORE 
ON THE NEW YORK BAR EXAMINATION: FEBRUARY 2006 BAR ADMINISTRATION 5 (June 
19, 2007) [hereinafter NY REPORT 2007], available at 
https://www.nybarexam.org/press/nyrep_feb06.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ECE-43UV]. 
132.  See MROCH ET AL, NY REPORT 2007, supra note 135 at 46. 
133.  See Douglas R. Ripkey & Susan M. Case, A National Look at MBE Performance 
Differences Among Ethnic Groups, B. EXAM’R 21, 24 (Aug. 2007) [hereinafter MBE 
Performance Differences].  
134.  Ripkey & Case, MBE Performance Differences, supra note 137, at 26.  
135.  LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LSAC NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL BAR PASS STUDY (1998). 
The authority of Wightman’s research is based on its unmatched combination of scale, 
research rigor, and transparency. 
136.  Id. at 27.   
137.  See supra text accompanying notes __ (presenting race and ethnicity results from 
California and New York).  
138.  For an explanation of why multiple choice tests are used for this purpose and the 
scaling process by which written answers are scaled to the multiple choice tests, see Joan 
W. Howarth, The Case for a Uniform Cut Score, 42 J. OF LEGAL PROF. 69, 72 (2017) 
[hereinafter Cut Score], citing to Susan M. Case, Back to Basic Principles: Validity and 
Reliability, B. EXAM’R 23, 23 (Aug. 2006). The scaling process permits the MBE cut score 
to determine the passing percentage for the entire exam, so the cut score could be called 
the bar exam cut score or the MBE cut score, as I prefer.  
139.  Exams, MBE, NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS, http://www.ncbex.org/exams/mbe/ 
[https://perma.cc/4MYS-ZFK7] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020) (showing that all U.S. 
jurisdictions but Louisiana currently use the MBE).   
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the legal profession veers away from psychometric standards and passing 
score (cut score) determinations in other professions in a very significant 
way. Other professions establish a uniform, national cut score for the 
multiple-choice test used to establish minimal competence.140 By contrast, 
due to deeply entrenched traditions and preferences in the legal profession, 
each jurisdiction has held on to its authority to set its own MBE cut score.141 
This tradition of strong local control has resulted in wide disparities in how 
states use the same test to assess the same thing, minimal competence to 
practice law. The cut score is an important aspect of the validity of the 
licensing test.142 The wide range of cut scores used for the MBE undermines 
confidence that any one of them accurately reflects minimal competence to 
practice law.   
The setting of cut scores also plays a powerful role in the disparate 
impact of bar exams.143 Selecting a different cut score is probably the easiest 
way for bar examiners and state courts to reduce the disparate impact of 
their exams. Bar examiners should understand that “[a]rtificially high bar 
passage standards are of special concern because those standards can have 
a disproportionate impact on minority applicants to the bar.”144  
Some jurisdictions have pulled back from increasing their cut score in 
part because of the evidence that increasing the cut score would exacerbate 
pre-existing disparities in bar passage rates.  In the midst of a movement in 
many jurisdictions to increase bar exam cut scores,145 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court chose not to increase their cut score146 and New York 
implemented only the first of three planned increases.147 In both 
 
140.  Howarth, Cut Score, supra note 142, at 73–74.  
141.  Id. at 69–71.  
142.  Id. at 75 (citing AM. EDUC. RES. ASS’N., AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, & NAT’L COUNCIL OF 
MEAS. IN EDUC., STANDARDS FOR EDUC. AND PSYCH. TESTING at 100 (2014)); John Mattar 
et al., Reviewing or Revalidating Performance Standards on Credentialing Examinations, 
in SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: FOUNDATIONS, METHODS, AND INNOVATIONS 
(Gregory J. Cizek, ed., 2d ed. 2012) at 399–400.  
143. See Johnson, supra note 124, at 419 (2013) (urging adoption of a uniform cut score, 
130, to diversify the profession). 
144.  Merritt et al., Raising the Bar, supra note 8, at 965; see Stephen P. Klein & Roger 
Bolus, The Size and Source of Differences in Bar Exam Passing Rates Among Racial and 
Ethnic Groups, 6 B. EXAM’R 8, 8 (Nov. 1997) (discussed in Merritt et al., supra note 8, at 
966–67).    
145.  See Merritt et al, Raising the Bar, supra note 8. 
146.  See Transcript, Public Meeting, Board of Bar Examiners, Supreme Court of 
Minnesota (Mar. 9, 2000) (on file with author); Letter from Minn. Board of Bar Examiners 
to Robert D. Langford (Aug. 31, 1999) (on file with author); MICHAEL T. KANE, REVIEW 
OF THE STANDARD-SETTING STUDY OF THE JULY 1997 MINNESOTA BAR EXAM (Aug. 2000) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter MINN. REPORT].  
147.  See MROCH ET AL., NY REPORT 2007, supra note 135. “On September 24, 2004, the 
New York State Board of Law Examiners (“NYBLE”) announced that the passing score 
on the New York Bar Examination would increase from 660 to 675 over a three-year 
period. [please provide citation]. The score was to increase five points a year from July 
2005 to July 2007. [please provide citation]. The first of the three increases was 
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jurisdictions, proposed increases were rejected because of concerns that the 
justification for the increases was based on flawed methodology148 and that 
the increases would exacerbate pre-existing racial and ethnic bar passage 
disparities.149  
In their report regarding New York’s possible cut score increase, NCBE 
psychometricians explained two reasons that raising New York’s cut score 
would exacerbate racially disparate bar passage outcomes. First, the largest 
impact falls on groups “with average scores in or near the range over which 
the passing score is projected to vary.”150 African Americans and other 
minorities were the groups whose average scores were closest to the existing 
cut score and the proposed changes, so the possible cut score increases 
would have had a disproportionate effect on them.151 Also, even an identical 
change across all demographic groups would be proportionately greater for 
any groups with lower original pass rates.152  
California’s study of its bar exam cut score provides more recent 
confirmation of the racial and ethnic impact of cut score decisions. This 
study used the scores of the actual 2016 California bar exam takers to 
calculate what the passage rates would have been with several lower cut 
scores.153 The results showed that for each of the cut scores studied, ranging 
from the low of New York’s to the high of California’s, the higher the cut 
score, the larger the racial disparities in pass rates.154 Dramatically, the 
 
implemented in July 2005. The second and third increases are currently on hold.” Id. at 2. 
The second and third increases were never made. See NCBE, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
BAR ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS 2015, at 30, (Chart 9: Grading and Scoring) (showing 
New York passing score at 665), available at http://www.ncbex.org/pubs/bar-admissions-
guide/2015/mobile/index.html#p=42 [https://perma.cc/NCM9-2M6L].  
148.  See, e.g., KANE, MINN. REPORT, supra note 150;  Merritt et al., Raising the Bar, supra 
note 8; ASSOC. OF THE N.Y.C. BAR, COMM. ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, 
REPORT IN OPPOSITION TO THE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS’ PROPOSAL TO INCREASE THE 
PASSING SCORE ON THE NEW YORK BAR EXAMINATION at 8–18 (Jan. 2003) [hereinafter 
NYC BAR 2003 REPORT], available at https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/BARSCO~2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N4WU-7J7Q]. 
149.  See, e.g., Merritt et al, Raising the Bar, supra note 8; NYC BAR 2003 REPORT, supra 
note 152; MROCH ET AL., NY REPORT 2007, supra note 135; Transcript, supra note 150.  
150.  “The current and proposed increases in the passing score tend to have the largest 
impact on groups with average scores in or near the range over which the passing score is 
projected to vary (660 to 675).” MROCH ET AL., NY REPORT 2007, supra note 135, at 85. 
151.  “Among the domestic-educated first-time takers, the Black/African American group 
and other minority groups tend to suffer sharper declines in pass rates than the 
Caucasian/White group as the passing score increases (see Table 4.2).” Id. 
152.  “[B]ecause the racial/ethnic minority groups have lower pass rates to begin, a 
decrease of a few percentage points in the pass rate has a larger proportional impact on the 
pass rates for these groups.” Id. 
153.  See STATE BAR OF CAL., FINAL REPORT ON THE 2017 CALIFORNIA BAR EXAM 
STUDIES (2017), App. A,  https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/reports/2017-
Final-Bar-Exam-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTU4-DQN6] [hereinafter 2017 CAL. 
REPORT] (unnumbered pages but pdf 186/305). 
154.  Id. 
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report showed that of the 3248 people who passed the July 2016 California 
bar exam, 119 were African American.155 If California had used New 
York’s cut score, 301 African Americans would have passed.156  
Lowering cut scores improves pass rates for every category of test-
takers, but not evenly. If California had lowered its cut score to the score 
currently used by New York, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, and South Carolina,157 the 
bar passage rate of Whites in 2016 would have increased by 51.7%; of 
Asians by 71.7%; of Hispanics by  93.7%; and of Blacks by 142.3%.158 In 
spite of this information, and the State Bar’s acknowledgment that no 
evidence suggested that the public is less protected in states with lower cut 
scores,159 the California Supreme Court declined to decrease its unusually 
high cut score.160  
Cut score decisions permit jurisdictions to choose to reduce or 
exacerbate the racial and ethnic disparate impact of bar exams. Under either 
Title VII or professional responsibility licensing scrutiny, choosing to keep 
a cut score with established disparate impact requires strong evidence that 
the increase in the cut score is job-related.161  
Disparate impact having been established, jurisdictions should have to 
show evidence of job-relatedness to select any cut score above 130, the 
second-lowest cut score in the United States, which is currently being used 
successfully by Alabama, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, and North 
Dakota.162  These five states cover different regions of the country, and 
 
155.  Id. 
156.  Id. 
157.  NCBE, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS 2019, at 32–33 
(Chart 10: Grading and Scoring), http://www.ncbex.org/assets/BarAdmissionGuide/NCBE-CompGuide-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZP5U-RL35]. 
158.  2017 CAL. REPORT, supra note 157, at App. A (unnumbered but pdf 186/305).  
159.  Id. at ___.  
160.  Letter from Cal. Supreme Court to Michael G. Colantuono, President, Bd. of Trs. & 
Leah Wilson, Exec. Dir. State Bar of Cal., (Oct. 18, 2017), available at  
https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/supreme-court-issues-letter-relating-to-in-re-
california-bar-exam [https://perma.cc/HS7V-7M25] (discussing retaining existing cut 
score on California bar examination). 
161.  “[E]nforcement agencies and many courts have taken the position that sufficient proof 
of job relatedness must support the use of a cutoff score that increases disparate impact.” 
LINDEMANN, supra note 14, at 4–55 to 56 & n. 273.  
162.  130 is the lowest cut score currently being used by a cohort of states. See NCBE, 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS 2019, at 32–33 (Chart 10: 
Grading and Scoring), available at http://www.ncbex.org/assets/BarAdmissionGuide/NCBE-CompGuide-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V7BJ-PR3Z]; see also Johnson, Knots in the Pipeline, supra note 124, at 
405–19 (recommending 130 as uniform cut score to diversify the profession). Wisconsin 
uses a 129, but Wisconsin’s diploma privilege for all law graduates of Wisconsin and 
Marquette makes Wisconsin a weak example for a well-established cut score, although an 
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include a variety of practice areas, such as international firms in Minnesota 
and Missouri, rural practices in several of these states, and private practice, 
government, and nonprofit practice in all of them. No evidence suggests 
that the public suffers less competent lawyers in these states than in 
others.163 
 
III.  DISPARATE IMPACT RESPONSIBILITY. 
 
Bar examiners defend disparate results on bar exams by arguing that 
bar passage differences reflect prior differences, such as on the LSAT and 
in law school grades.164 Bar examiners cannot be expected to eliminate 
preexisting differences at the licensing stage, the final step on the path to 
the profession. But bar examiners should be expected to eliminate 
unnecessary disparities in their test results. Unjustified disparities offend 
core professional responsibilities of the legal profession to eliminate 
discrimination. Beyond that, professional testing standards require careful 
scrutiny of disparate results. After explaining that fairness in testing does 
not mean eliminating all disparities in results, the most authoritative source 
of testing standards reminds test designers that “most testing professionals 
agree that group differences in testing outcomes should trigger heightened 
scrutiny for possible sources of bias.”165 In the world of bar exams, that 
scrutiny has focused on item selection and question drafting.166 Cut score 
scrutiny and increased focus on job-relatedness, or validity, are equally 
important. The responsibility to address these longstanding disparities falls 
squarely on the state supreme court justices and bar examiners who have 
the responsibility to ensure that the admissions processes they oversee are 
nondiscriminatory.  
 
B.   VALIDITY   
 
 
important model for deeper reimagining of attorney licensing. See Beverly Moran, The 
Wisconsin Diploma Privilege: Try It, You’ll Like It, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 645–46 (2000).   
163.  Research to investigate this question could be very useful. For a discussion of 
complexities of such research, see Deborah J. Merritt, Bar Exam Scores and Lawyer 
Discipline, LAW SCHOOL CAFÉ (June 3, 2017), 
https://www.lawschoolcafe.org/2017/06/03/bar-exam-scores-and-lawyer-discipline/ 
[https://perma.cc/6RMS-F62L]. 
164.  Ripkey & Case, supra note 137, at 26. 
165.  STANDARDS, 2014, supra note 106, at 54. “Examination of group differences also 
may be important in generating new hypotheses about bias, fair treatment, and the 
accessibility of the construct as measured; and, in fact, there may be legal requirements to 
investigate certain differences in the outcomes of testing among subgroups.” Id.  
166.  See, e.g., Joanne Kane & April Southwick, The Testing Column: Writing, Selecting, 
and Placing MBE Items: A Coordinated and Collaborative Effort, 88 B. EXAM’R (2019), 
available at https://thebarexaminer.org/article/spring-2019/the-testing-
column-writing-selecting-and-placing-mbe-items-a-coordinated-and-
collaborative-effort/ [https://perma.cc/GSG9-LKYG]. 
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Following Title VII, once the disparate impact of a bar exam is 
established, the second step of professional responsibility licensing scrutiny 
requires bar examiners to show that the exam is valid, meaning sufficiently 
job-related. Bar exams are valid to the extent that they in fact measure 
minimal competence to practice law, as they are meant to do.167 Potentially 
impressive studies relevant to the validity of bar exams may provide 
important answers in the future.168 But criticisms of the validity of bar 
exams are widespread and longstanding,169 and they ask the same questions 
concerning job-relatedness and validity that employers are required to 
answer pursuant to Title VII.170 
 
I.    MISDIRECTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW, NOT THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
 
One persistent criticism is that bar exams look backwards to law school 
rather than forward to law practice, testing the academic skills of law school 
rather than the professional skills required for minimum competence in 
practice.171 This criticism carries weight because of the surprising distance 
between law school and practice. For one hundred and fifty years, law 
schools in the United States have been largely aligned with the “scientific” 
 
167.  See supra text accompanying notes __ (explaining validity and job-relatedness). 
168.  See infra text accompanying notes __.  
169.  See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Validity, Competence, and the Bar Exam, AALS 
NEWS, ASSOC. AM. L. SCHS., No. 2017-2, at 11, https://www.aals.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/AALSnews_spring17-v9.pdf [https://perma.cc/8473-DXJH] 
(critiquing validity of bar exams) (hereinafter Validity); Joan Howarth, Teaching in the 
Shadow of the Bar, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 927, 930 (1997) (summarizing earlier criticisms of 
bar examinations); Society of American Law Teachers Statement on the Bar Exam, 52 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 446 (2002) (critiquing traditional bar examinations on three principal 
grounds: failure to adequately measure professional competence to practice law, negative 
effects on law school curricular development and the law school admission process, and 
creation of significant barriers to achieving a more diverse bench and bar); Curcio et al, 
Testing, supra note 8, at 225 (“As far back as 1992, the Committee on Legal Education of 
the New York City Bar Association identified problematic aspects of the bar exam and 
expressed the view that ‘the NYS Bar Exam does not adequately or effectively test minimal 
competence to practice law in New York.’”).   
170.  See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION (2002) (noting that critics of bar exams claim that “the 
skills existing exams measure do not adequately predict performance as a lawyer” (at 223) 
and that the “inadequate link between exam and job performance is of special concern 
because minority applicants have disproportionately low passage rates” (at 224, quoting 
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
at 151 (2000)); Abel, Lawyer Self-regulation, supra note 3, at 115 (“As Weber noted, 
examinations became the dominant entry barrier in the twentieth century. These have an 
unproven – and arguably dubious – relationship to the knowledge lawyers actually utilise 
in their daily practice (in the language of psychologists: they have never been validated).”) 
(footnote omitted). 
171.  See, e.g., Curcio, A Better Bar, supra note 8, at 364–65 (urging reform to test 
additional skills required for law practice); Howarth & Wegner, Ringing Changes, supra 
note 8, at 430–31, 447–56.  
32  
approach of Langdell that focused on dissection of appellate decisions in a 
university setting.172 For this and other reasons, lawyering skills beyond 
core analytic skills are relatively recent additions to law school programs, 
and still peripheral at too many law schools.173 Legal education requires 
substantially less clinical experience than other professional schools,174 and 
nothing guarantees that law school graduates have ever seen a courthouse, 
a client, or a lawyer. In these circumstances, licensing tests that replicate the 
most traditional aspects of law school are not closely connected to legal 
practice. 
 
II.   LACK OF JOB ANALYSIS 
 
Employers facing Title VII use job analyses to establish the validity of 
employment tests with disparate impacts.175 Licensing tests also rely on job 
analyses for validity: “The standard and most useful device for representing 
the construct of professional competence is a job or practice analysis.”176  
Until very recently, job analysis research for bar exams has been almost 
non-existent. It is still very lacking. 
The NCBE did a job analysis in 2012.177 Other than the addition of civil 
procedure to the subjects covered by the MBE, which may or may not have 
been in the works before that study,178 little in the exam appears to have 
changed in response to this research. The focus on testing memorized legal 
knowledge continues, although twenty-five skills were determined to be of 
 
172.  See, e.g., RHODE & HAZARD, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION, 
supra note 174, at 201–03; Edward Rubin, What's Wrong with Langdell's Method, and 
What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, [pincite] (2007).  
173.  For explanations of legal education’s focus away from clinical lawyering skills, see 
Howarth & Wegner, Ringing Changes, supra note 8, at 428–31.  
174.  See Howarth & Wegner, Ringing Changes, supra note 8, at 428–31; Peter A. Joy, 
The Uneasy History of Experiential Education in U.S. Law Schools, 122 DICKINSON L. 
REV. 551, [pincite] (2018).  
175.  See supra text accompanying notes __; Guardians Ass’n of the N.Y.C. Police Dep’t., 
Inc. v. Civil Service Comm’n, 630 F.2d 79, 95–96 (2d Cir. 1980). 
176.  THOMAS M. HALADYNA & MICHAEL C. RODRIGUEZ, DEVELOPING AND VALIDATING 
TEST ITEMS 283 (2013). 
177.  See STEVEN NETTLES & JAMES HELLRUNG (AMP), NAT'L CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS, 
A STUDY OF THE NEWLY LICENSED LAWYER (2012). For discussion of this job analysis, see 
Susan Case, The NCBE Job Analysis: A Study of the Newly Licensed Lawyer, B. EXAM’R, 
Mar. 2013, at 52 [https://perma.cc/SDK4-92CH] (study relied on distributing surveys to 
more than 20,000 new admittees whose email addresses were provided by the National 
Conference of Bar Examiners. Only 1,669 responses (8.4%) were returned and usable). See 
NETTLES AND HELLRUNG, A STUDY OF THE NEWLY LICENSED LAWYER, supra note __, at 
9. 
178.  See Case, The NCBE Job Analysis, supra note 181, at 53 (addition of Civil Procedure 
was planned prior to the study); NCBE, TESTING TASK FORCE, TESTING TASK FORCE FIRST 
YEAR REPORT at 1 (Apr. 2019), available at https://testingtaskforce.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/NCBE_TestingTaskForce_FirstYear_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RGC8-CA2P] (describing addition of Civil Procedure following 
evaluation of 2012 study results). 
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greater importance than the most important knowledge domain, Civil 
Procedure.179 The NCBE has recently undertaken a promising new practice 
analysis study using a different methodology than it used in 2012.180  
California is also undertaking a long-overdue job study. In her 2017 
report on the California bar’s standard setting study, Dr. Tracy Montez of 
the California Department of Consumer Affairs, criticized the lack of a job 
study to provide the basis for California’s bar exam: “Given that a state-
specific occupational analysis does not appear to have been conducted, it is 
critical to have this baseline for making high-stakes decisions.”181 At the 
same time, Professor Deborah Merritt made the same criticism: 
“California’s bar exam—like the exams in other states—has never been 
validated. This means that no job analysis or other scientific study links the 
exam’s content to the skills and knowledge needed by new attorneys.”182  
California’s own 2017 Content Validation Study also identified the need for 
a job analysis.183 In response, California has recently begun a job analysis 
 
179.  See Case, The NCBE Job Analysis, supra note 181, at 54–55. 
180.  See From Practice Analysis to Test Redesign: Looking Ahead to Phase Three, NCBE, 
TESTING TASKFORCE, https://www.testingtaskforce.org/2019/09/10/from-practice-
analysis-to-test-redesign-looking-ahead-to-phase-three/ [https://perma.cc/RA3P-7ZE9] 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2020); NCBE, TESTING TASK FORCE, TESTING TASK FORCE FIRST 
YEAR REPORT (Apr. 2019), available at https://www.testingtaskforce.org/about/reports/ 
(describing the Testing Task Force as having determined to start from scratch in 
determining requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities required for new lawyers).  
181.  Tracy A. Montez, Observations of the Standard Setting Study for the California Bar 
Examination 10 (Calif. Dept. of Consumer Affairs, July 2017),  
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/admissions/Examinations/Tracy-Montez-
ReviewBarExamstudy.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SRB-W7NK]. Dr. Montez explained that 
such a study was needed for, among other purposes, “determining content to be measured 
on the [California Bar Exam]; creating a common frame of reference . . . when establishing 
passing scores; providing preparation and training information to candidates and schools.” 
Id.  
182.  Letter from Professor Deborah Merritt, John Deaver Drinko, Baker & Hostetler Chair 
in Law at the Ohio State Univ., Moritz College of Law, to California Supreme Court In re 
California Bar Exam (Oct. 1, 2017), available at 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/559b2478e4b05d22b1e75b2d/t/5d64402118a0f700
01180c43/1566851106501/2017.10.1+Merritt_Letter+to+Cal+Supreme+Ct.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YGH6-2WPC]. In the same spate of bar exam research, California also 
conducted a content validation study in which ten lawyers from diverse backgrounds and 
length of practice evaluated components of the California Bar Exam using the NCBE’s 
2012 practice analysis. See CHAD W. BUCHENDAHL, CONDUCTING A CONTENT 
VALIDATION STUDY FOR THE CALIFORNIA BAR EXAM: FINAL REPORT (Oct. 4, 2017), 
available at 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/admissions/Examinations/CBEStudy_Atta
chment_A.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TVY-T6VA] [hereinafter CAL. CONTENT VALIDATION 
STUDY 2017]. 
183.  See BUCHENDAHL, CAL. CONTENT VALIDATION STUDY 2017, supra note 186. This 
study found that the components of the bar exam aligned with knowledge and skills 
identified in the 2012 study but also identified the need for a design process that used a 
new job analysis as the blueprint for the exam. Id.  
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study that will be based on surveys, focus groups, and task sampling in 
which attorneys will receive randomly timed prompts to identify the tasks 
they are engaged in at the time of the prompt.184 
The Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System 
(“IAALS”) is also conducting ambitious research with Professor Deborah 
Merritt that should provide important insights about the meaning of 
minimum competence in law. This national project is using forty to sixty 
focus groups of both new lawyers and supervisors of new lawyers to 
determine the knowledge and skills used by the new lawyers and how those 
necessary knowledge and skills are obtained.185 
The NCBE, California State Bar, and IAALS job analyses will bring 
important insights about what minimum competence looks like. Those 
insights should serve as the blueprint for designing a bar exam or other 
licensing requirements, but they are not currently in place to validate bar 
exams. Our rituals of bar exams are well-settled, but the appropriate 
foundations to show the validity of the tests have been absent.   
 
III.  PROFESSIONAL DESIGN 
 
Another aspect of Title VII validity is that the test is professionally 
designed.186 The multistate components (Multistate Bar Exam; Multistate 
Essay Exam; and Multistate Performance Test) created by the NCBE are 
professionally designed, one important argument for the Uniform Bar 
Exam.187 But state essays are typically written by accomplished lawyers 
without expertise in test design.188 In this important respect, many bar 
exams suffer from the same critique offered by the Fourth Circuit in 1976, 
 
184.  See CAL. STATE BAR, Attorney Practice Analysis for the California State Bar, 
https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/Practice_Analysis_Fact_Sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8X9G-TKST] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019).  
185.  See Zachary Willis & Kelsey Montague, New Effort Underway to Improve the Bar 
Exam and Lawyer Licensing, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS. (JULY 
29, 2019), https://iaals.du.edu/blog/new-effort-underway-improve-bar-exam-and-lawyer-
licensing [https://perma.cc/272R-6TP9] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019).  
186.  See, e.g., text accompanying notes __, supra, and Guardians Ass’n of the N.Y.C. 
Police Dep’t., Inc. v. Civil Service Comm’n, 630 F.2d 79, 96–97 (2d Cir. 1980). 
187.  See Judith A. Gundersen, MEE and MPT Test Development: A Walk-Through from 
First Draft to Administration, B. EXAM’R 29 (June 2015) (describing creation of essay and 
performance tests); Kane & Southwick, supra note 170 (describing creation of MBE 
questions). 
188.  See, e.g., MICH. SUPREME COURT, BD. OF BAR EXAM’RS, Improved Scoring System 
for the Michigan Bar Examination Summary, 
https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/BLE/Documents/ImprovedSc
oringSystemSummary7-9-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6UA-LP7B] (last visited Apr. 14, 
2020) (members produce or supervise the production of essay questions); STATE BAR OF 
NEV., Board of Bar Examiners, https://www.nvbar.org/about-us/bar-committees/board-of-
bar-examiners/ [https://perma.cc/FYC7-PLJM] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020) (the board 
writes and grades bar exam questions).    
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that the bar exam questions were written and graded by “competent lawyers 
but laymen at question design and evaluation.”189   
 
IV.  SCORING SYSTEMS THAT REFLECT PRACTICE COMPETENCE 
 
Employers attempting to defend tests with disparate impact under Title 
VII also try to establish that their scoring systems reflect actual job 
performance.190 Richardson v. McFadden, discussed above, presented a 
dismal picture of bar exam scoring, with some graders using detailed rubrics 
but adding points at the end, while another graded on an overall 
impression.191 The court upheld those exam practices even after declaring 
that the chance of a “70” score being meaningful was close to zero.192 
Grading practices in many jurisdictions are much more professional 
today, but not everywhere. Grading details are often hidden.  Some 
jurisdictions hold calibration sessions; some do not. Some jurisdictions have 
elaborate regrading processes for close cases; some do not. Some 
jurisdictions provide detailed sample grading rubrics or model answers; 
some do not.  
Another crucial aspect of validity in scoring relates to establishing the 
cut score that determines passing or failing. Unlike virtually all other 
professions using a national multiple-choice licensing test to establish 
minimal competence, bar examiners set cut scores jurisdiction-by-
jurisdiction, often without any process for setting that cut score.193 The 
disparity in cut scores itself, without any evidence that competence varies 
by jurisdiction, undermines the validity of bar exams.194 The questionable 
basis upon which cut scores are determined is especially problematic 
considering the data showing that higher cut scores exacerbate racial and 
ethnic disparities in bar passage results.195 
 
C.   ALTERNATIVES  
 
Even if validity of the test could be established, the final stage of 
disparate impact analysis under Title VII or professional responsibility 
licensing scrutiny asks whether valid alternatives that are less 
discriminatory exist.196 In the licensing context, this is the most important 
question, and the most promising. As Professor Deborah Merritt urges, “If 
the exam tests the wrong things, we have a professional obligation to change 
 
189.  Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744, 750 (4th Cir. 1976), on reh'g, 563 F.2d 1130 
(4th Cir. 1977). 
190. See, e.g., Guardians, 630 F.2d at 9100–06. 
191.  See supra text accompanying notes __. 
192.  See supra text accompanying notes __.  
193.  See Cut Score, supra note 142. 
194.  See supra text accompanying notes __.  
195.  See supra text accompanying notes __.  
196.  See infra text accompanying notes __.  
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it.”197 Bar examiners wedded to conventional bar exams need to address the 
disparate impact and validity questions related to those exams, including the 
looming cut score problems, instead of continuing to rely on the effective 
impunity that came with immunity from Title VII. The future belongs to 
alternatives that assess minimal competence more effectively with less 
discriminatory impact. Several hopeful signs are worth describing.    
 
I.  NEW HAMPSHIRE’S DANIEL WEBSTER SCHOLAR PROGRAM. 
 
Frustrated by the lack of competence of too many new lawyers, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court and Committee of Bar Examiners took action 
and began an exciting collaboration with the University of New Hampshire 
School of Law.198 In the resulting Daniel Webster Honors Program, 
students undertake a rigorous curriculum of a range of core lawyering skills 
in their second and third years of law school, assessed by law professors, 
practitioners, bar examiners, and judges.199 Students who successfully 
complete the Daniel Webster program may be admitted to practice law in 
New Hampshire upon graduation from law school.200 An IAALS study of 
focus groups and a simulated client interview established that the Daniel 
Webster graduates were evaluated more highly than other new lawyers and 
that Daniel Webster law students out-performed new lawyers on a 
standardized client interview.201 That a two-year program would have 
greater validity than a two-day paper and pencil test is not surprising.  
The IAALS study also established that participation in the Daniel 
Webster program was the only significant predictor of successful 
performance of the standardized client interview, and that neither LSAT nor 
law school class rank was a significant predictor.202 This study of a single, 
albeit crucial, lawyering skill is suggestive. The greater significance of an 
academic lawyering program than either LSAT or law school grades 
 
197.  Merritt, supra note 173, at 11.12 
198.  John Burwell Garvey & Anne F. Zinkin, Making Law Students Client-Ready: A 
New Model in Legal Education, 1 DUKE F. LAW & SOC. CHANGE 101, 115–17 (2009), 
available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=dflsc 
[https://perma.cc/N7GN-FBT5]. 
199.  See Univ. of N.H. Franklin Pierce School of Law, Daniel Webster Scholar Program, 
https://law.unh.edu/academics/experiential-education/daniel-webster-scholar-program 
[https://perma.cc/C5FY-84DU] (last visited Dec. 28, 2019).   
200.  For descriptions of the program by its founding director, see John Burwell Garvey, 
‘Making Law Students Client-Ready’ – The Daniel Webster Scholar Honors Program: A 
Performance-Based Variant of the Bar Exam, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N. J. 44 (2013); Garvey 
supra note 202, at 115–17. 
201.  ALLI GERKMAN & ELENA HARMAN, AHEAD OF THE CURVE: TURNING LAW STUDENTS 
INTO LAWYERS 1 (IAALS 2015), 
https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/ahead_of_the_curve_turnin
g_law_students_into_lawyers.pdf [https://perma.cc/93K4-GRBA].  
202.  Id. 
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suggests that testing a broader range of competencies may improve validity 
and reduce the persistent racial disparities of bar exams, which suffers from 
disparities endemic to standardized tests, including the LSAT.  The active 
involvement of the bench and the bar in the Daniel Webster Scholars 
Program, from the original instigation to the ongoing evaluation of student 
performance, is an excellent example of the public benefit from professional 
responsibility licensing scrutiny in action.  
 
II.  CANADA’S PRACTICE READINESS EDUCATION PROGRAM. 
 
The articling system in Canada by which law graduates must obtain law 
practice experience creates significant problems of unequal access to the 
profession,203 as have similar systems in other countries.204 But a newer 
aspect of licensure in Alberta, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan 
may suggest a more valid and less discriminatory future for attorney 
licensing in the United States. Each of those provinces now requires, instead 
of a traditional bar exam, a nine-month, part-time Practice Readiness 
Education Program (“PREP”)205 undertaken during the law graduates’ 
period of articling and offered by the Canadian Centre for Professional 
Legal Education (“CPRED”), a non-profit consortium led by 
representatives of the four provincial law societies.206 PREP is a hybrid of 
in-person workshops and online modules that focus on “practical legal 
knowledge” and “competencies in lawyer skills, practice management, 
professional ethics, as well as the personal attributes needed to successfully 
practice law in Canada.”207 A consortium of U.S. jurisdictions could offer 
a similar program during the weeks following law school graduation 
currently spent in bar review courses. Rather than pay for bar review 
classes, participants could pay for classes teaching competencies that are 
clearly important to clients. Passing those classes would replace additional 
licensing testing.  
 
203.  See, e.g., Marlisse Silver Sweeney, Discrimination and Power Imbalances Plague 
Canada’s Lawyer Training Process, LAW.COM, (Dec. 20, 2019) 
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2019/12/20/discrimination-and-power-imbalances-
plague-canadas-lawyer-training-process/ [https://perma.cc/6K68-8YJE]; CAN. B. ASSOC., 
LAW FUTURES REPORT (2014).  
204.  See, e.g., Peggy Maisel, The Education and Licensing of Attorneys and Advocates in 
South Africa, 79 BAR EXAM’R 15, 21 (May 2010) (“Since it is the candidate attorney’s 
responsibility to find the law firm or lawyer for articles, the practical effect of this 
requirement has been to make it more difficult for nonwhite law graduates to obtain 
admission as attorneys.”).  
205.  See Practice Readiness Education Program (PREP) Fact Sheet, available at 
https://cpled.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/PREP-Program-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2019).  
206.  See About CPLED, https://cpled.ca/about-cpled/who-we-are/https://cpled.ca/about-
cpled/who-we-are/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2019).  
207.  See Practice Readiness Education Program (PREP) Fact Sheet, supra note 209. 
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III.  NCBE’S TESTING TASK FORCE 
 
Another reason for optimism about the future of bar exams in the United 
States is the NCBE’s Testing Task Force, a three-year project started in 
2018 that is designed to “ensure that the bar examination continues to test 
the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for competent entry-level legal 
practice in a changing profession.”208 The first phase of the project was a 
series of “stakeholder listening sessions” intended to “solicit input from 
various stakeholder groups about characteristics and considerations for the 
next generation of the bar examination.”209 Key findings include many that 
are consistent with professional responsibility licensing scrutiny, such as 
“[e]nsuring that the bar examination is free from racial/ethnic/gender bias 
is a priority”210 and “[l]awyering skills should be emphasized over subject  
matter knowledge.”211  
 
IV.  FURTHER ALTERNATIVES 
 
Possibilities abound for rethinking attorney licensing to bring it closer 
to the competence actually required in today’s practice of law.212 
Competencies that should be considered for testing include advanced 
subject matter, advanced thinking (including evaluation and strategizing), 
metacognition and reflection, focused in-depth inquiry in areas of expertise 
(specialization), and additional practice skills, such as fact-gathering or 
interviewing.213 Potential test design changes include open-book tests to 
more closely approximate practice; reframing multiple-choice questions, 
such as those based on “case files” that could assess research skills and case 
theories; simulations and portfolios; and component-based testing.214 
Technology and advances in artificial intelligence permit testing methods 
 
208.  About, NCBE TESTING TASK FORCE, https://testingtaskforce.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/KBM8-NAVE] (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).  
209.  NCBE TESTING TASK FORCE, Testing Task Force Phase 1 Listening Sessions 
Executive Summary in YOUR VOICE: STAKEHOLDER THOUGHTS ON THE BAR EXAM, at 1 
(2019), available at https://www.testingtaskforce.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/FINAL-Listening-Session-Executive-Summary-with-
Appendices-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2PJ-JQ9N].  
210.  Id. at 5. This priority is framed as scrutiny of any changes, suggesting complacency 
about current bar exam practices.  
211.  Id. at 3. 
212.  See, e.g., Howarth supra note 8, at 397. 
213.  Id. at 448–56.  
214.  Id. at 456–61.  
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that would have been impossible just a few years ago.215 Our professional 
responsibilities related to public protection, competence, and 
nondiscrimination demand that we take advantage of these new possibilities 
to improve the validity of attorney licensing. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Borrowing the framework of Title VII disparate impact scrutiny 
provides a practical, feasible approach to ensuring that licensing tests are 
not wrongfully excluding people of color from the legal profession. But 
eliminating bias in the profession is largely a matter of will, not feasibility.   
Professional responsibility licensing scrutiny holds members of the 
profession, bar examiners, and state supreme courts to the values and goals 
we already claim as a profession. But principles of professional 
responsibility and legal ethics may be self-serving window dressing,216 not 
even truly aspirational, let alone enforceable without careful scrutiny and 
concrete action. Do we aspire to be a nondiscriminatory and inclusive 
profession dedicated to public protection and grounded in competence? Do 
we agree that the disparate impact of bar exams is a sufficiently serious 
problem to justify careful scrutiny regarding validity and less 
discriminatory alternatives?  Or do we prefer to rely on our own good faith?    
From today’s perspective, the Vickery, Parrish, Richardson, & 
Woodard cases reveal lawyers dedicated to maintaining a racially restrictive 
profession through discriminatory bar exam practices. Those bar examiners 
prevailed with arguments that they were operating fairly and in good faith 
to protect the public by ensuring the competence of new lawyers. Their 
 
215.  For example, the NCBE has recently converted the Multistate Professional 
Responsibility Exam to a computer-based delivery system. See Mark A. Albanese, The 
Testing Column: July 2019 MBE: Here Comes the Sun; August 2019 MPRE: Here Comes 
the Computer, 88 BAR EXAM’R at 4, [please provide pincite] (2019). Law School 
Admissions Council (LSAC) researchers have studied various aspects of computer-based 
testing. See, e.g., Bernard P. Veldkamp, Some Practical Issues in Computerized-Adaptive 
Testing With Response Times (RR 14-06), LSAC, https://www.lsac.org/data-
research/research/some-practical-issues-computerized-adaptive-testing-response-times-rr-
14-06 [https://perma.cc/M465-XUCR]. Computational psychometrics is the emerging field 
bringing big data to the science of testing. See, e.g., COMPUTATIONAL PSYCHOMETRICS 
FIELD GUIDE, ACTNEXT, https://actnext.org/wp-
content/uploads/FieldGuide_ePUB_v4.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZ3D-CGLV] (describing 
assessment possibilities using new computational capacity and artificial intelligence). New 
technologies permit testing of new competencies. See, e.g., Vanessa R. Simmering, Lu Ou, 
& Maria Bolsinova, What Technology Can and Cannot Do to Support Assessment of Non-
Cognitive Skills, FRONT PSYCHOL. (Sept. 25, 2019), available at 
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02168/full 
[https://perma.cc/W4CW-GSAP].  
216.  “Although professions portray self-regulation as a means of reducing client 
uncertainty, they deliberately draft ethical rules in vague and ambiguous language to 
preserve the indeterminacy that is a foundation of professional power.” ABEL,  supra note 
1, at 38 (footnote omitted). 
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success has delayed for generations meaningful oversight of persistent 
racial disparities in passing rates for bar exams that suffer from 
unestablished validity. This is a problem with a solution. Decades of Title 
VII experience has created a simple, workable framework that can be used 
to determine whether the disparate impact of bar exams can be defended 
based on the validity of the exams, or whether less discriminatory 
alternatives should be substituted. Principles of professional responsibility 
and legal ethics justify this long-neglected oversight. Acceptance or 
rejection of this professional responsibility licensing scrutiny is itself a 
high-stakes test for our profession. We have the tools to pass this test, but 
only if we have the will to use them.  
  
 
 
 
 
